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Although the Costa Rican amparo is very much like the Mexican
amparo and the Brazilian mandado de segurana,1 fashioned for the pro-
tection of constitutional rights other than those embraced in habeas cor-
pus, the Costa Rican ambiente imports significant differences into the
functioning of its amparo. The rule of law may be said to hold sway
in Costa Rica to a greater extent than in many Latin American countries.
Costa Rica achieved independence from Spain without a revolution.
The particular way in which it did so may have averted the "legitimacy
vacuum" 2 experienced by Latin America generally. A Cabildo Abierto,
which included delegates from all ayuntamientos in the colony, was con-
vened in Cartago to subscribe to the Act of Independence and to call elec-
tions for delegates to a Junta de Legados. The Spanish Governor of the
province presided over the Cabildo and surrendered power directly to the
Junta de Legados two weeks later, at which time he also sailed for Spain.3
Peralta finds in this non-revolutionary succession of governments the seed
of Costa Rica's long-lived constitutional tradition.4
Since the Constitution of 1949, Costa Rica's elections have been fair
and regular, a circumstance which continues to insure the stability and
perceived legitimacy of its governments. 5 Thus, the Costa Rican judiciary
is not called upon to legitimate the government in power nor to save a
society where Judge Hand's "spirit of moderation" is gone.
Stability in Costa Rica derives also from the relative absence of au-
thoritarianism. There the Legislative branch of government dominates.
The Executive is much weaker than in most of Latin America so that the
Costa Rican president is far from a patr6n or caudillo.6 In the absence
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of authoritarianism, the constitutional tradition survives and in turn
strengthens Costa Rican democratic government. 7 A highly literate popu-
lace and an agrarian structure composed largely of small and medium-
sized farms8 provide additional protection against the authoritarianism
which pervades the governmental systems of other Latin American
countries.
Moreover, the Costa Rican Judiciary is exceptional for Latin America.
The Constitution of 1949 guaranteed a centralized, independent Judiciary.9
Judges are appointed by the Legislative Assembly for an eight-year term
with automatic renewal unless removed at the end of a term by two-
thirds of the Assembly. The Judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, is
much respected and free of corruption. 10
One would expect to find Costa Rican courts acting on the merits
and exercising independent judgment in deciding amparo actions against
government functionaries. That it has found for the plaintiff in only 15%
of amparo cases from 1950 through 1962 cannot be lightly attributed to
its submissiveness to the Executive or to its weakness in the face of
authoritarianism. The characteristics of Costa Rica's government and
people which differentiate it from other Latin American countries also
cast doubt on the validity of an analysis of Costa Rican amparo cases in
terms applicable to those other countries.
Consequently, this paper will examine the workings of the Costa
Rican amparo during the period 1950 through 1962 and delineate its
limitations as an action to protect constitutional rights. Then it will at-
tempt to discover the theories which Costa Rican courts apply in granting
or denying amparos.
WORKINGS OF AMPARO
The remedy of amparo originated with Art. 48 of the Constitution of
1949.11 It supplements the action of habeas corpus, 12 the action of "unconsti-
tutionality,"13 and the separate jurisdiction over lo contencioso-administra-
tivo.14 The Constitution embodied a wide range of rights in its 177 articles,
reflecting the social welfare reforms implemented in the 1940's by the
Calder6n government, as well as the progressive economic and social ideas
of the influential Social Democrat Party'" and the programs of the Center
for the Study of National Problems, from which evolved the National
Liberation Party.16 Among the "Social Rights and Guarantees" are the
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right to free choice of work, a minimum wage which will guarantee dig-
nity, an annual paid vacation, freedom of workers to organize, and the
state's obligation to redistribute wealth and to establish a social security
system. According to the Constitution, the amparo could be used to pro-
tect all these rights, but the implementing law and subsequent judicial
interpretation narrowed its utility considerably.
Jurisdiction of Amparo Actions
Law No. 1161 of June 2, 1950, vested jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court sitting in plenary session (Corte Plena) over amparo actions against
the President, Ministers of Government, Governors of the Provinces, Com-
mandants of the Plaza, and the Director General of the Civil Guard. Any
other case of amparo must be heard by the Penal Judge of the jurisdiction
where the act or omission occurred. 17
Many cases before the Corte Plena in this period involved municipal
resolutions affirmed by the Minister of the Interior or actions of municipal
officials (jejes politicos) approved routinely by the Governor of the
Province. Such relatively petty local matters were within the purview of
the Corte Plena merely because of the traditional control of municipal
government by the central government. lejes politicos and governors were
appointees of the central government and were responsible to it. 18 By a
process of "demunicipalization," autonomous central agencies and local
independent boards or national ministries took over municipal functions. 19
The flood of local issue amparo cases in the Corte Plena resulted from
the national locus of municipal government functions. 2 0 The framers of
the 1949 Constitution most likely did not contemplate this development,
particularly since they had provided for municipal autonomy in Art. 170.
Even cases which begin in lower courts may end up in the Supreme
Court, albeit not the Corte Plena. About half of the amparo cases brought
before a Penal Judge in the period under study were appealed to a Penal
Chamber of the Supreme Court as provided for in the Law of Amparo.
The lower courts were upheld in about two-thirds of the appeals.
Compliance with Procedural Requirements
Art. 10 of the Law of Amparo directs that the defendant official be
required to give information concerning the case in a speedy fashion. Art.
11 sets forth the brief time limits. From the cases, it appears that the
courts customarily send telegraphic inquiries specifically authorized by
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Art. 10 to the authority whose actions are being challenged. The defendant,
almost without exception, fires back extensive explanations in response and
sends along supporting documents.
The official faces a severe penalty for non-compliance with the order
to respond. If a reply has not arrived within the requisite time, which is
never more than a few days, the amparo will be granted without more.
And, as discussed below, once a court grants the amparo, the defendant
acts at a great risk if he violates the court order. In only two cases during
this period was the penalty for lack of response actually imposed, and
those courts indicated that the petitioners would have won on the merits
in any event. 21 The other three instances where the authority failed to
reply resulted in decisions against the petitioners although the courts
recognized that the terms of Art. 10 had not been met.22 In four of the
total of five cases, the request for information emanated from a Penal
Judge rather than from the Corte Plena. It is predictable that lower courts
will have more difficulty obtaining the cooperation of officials, and it is
almost certain that cooperation will decline as the courts show themselves
to be unwilling to impose the penalty at their command.
A second procedural aspect of the amparo has to do with the time-
liness of the petition itself. Art. 3(e) establishes an irrefutable presump-
tion of consent to the action complained of if an amparo is not instituted
within eight days of the incident.2 3 Research has revealed only one amparo
out of 201 in which a court invoked this presumption.24 There petitioners
had begun an action of "revocation" against a proposed resolution which
should, by the law governing actions of revocation, have brought an
answer in fifteen days. The petitioners had waited a month after the date
on which the answer was due to file their amparo petition protesting the
proposed resolution and the lack of response to their revocation action.
The Carte Plena was willing to count from the last date possible for the
reply rather than from publication of the proposed resolution, but peti-
tioners had acted too late even so and had thus presumptively consented
to the resolution.
Whether the remaining two hundred petitions were filed within the
statutory period does not necessarily appear on their face. Possibly other
petitioners acted outside the eight-day limit, but the court chose not to
invoke Art. 3(e). The case just discussed was also the only one during
this period which involved an attempt to block a proposed resolution.
Although strong pressures exist to limit the time within which an act of
an official may be challenged, it is even more imperative to restrict the
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period within which a proposed resolution can be prevented from becom-
ing law. As the court has presumed consent only in the latter situation,
one cannot conclude that courts stringently enforce the deadline in all
instances.
Public Authorities as Defendants
Neither Art. 48 of the Constitution of 1949 nor the Law of Amparo
expressly provides that amparo will lie only against acts or omissions of
public officials. However, every amparo petition singles out as a defendant
one or more public authorities. The limitation may be implicit in Art. 4
of the Law of Amparo:
The action will lie against any authority, functionary or em-
ployee, whether he acts on his own or in obedience to orders
from his superiors. In the latter case, the action will be under-
stood to be against the superior as well.
An examination of the amparo actions in this period reveals that
discretionary acts by public authorities form the subject matter of almost
all petitions. On this characteristic, the Costa Rican amparo can be dis-
tinguished from the Mexican amparo, which is only now beginning to
evolve a doctrine of abuse of discretion. 25 When the express provisions of
a law apply to a petitioner so that the enforcing authority is merely per-
forming a ministerial task, the amparo is in essence proceeding against
the law itself, which is forbidden by Art. 3(a) of the Law of Amparo,
discussed below. This, at least, is the rationale of Costa Rican courts.
When, however, one in authority must make a judgment as to granting
licenses or permits, shutting down businesses, expropriating land, or con-
fiscating so-called subversive literature, he is exposing himself to an
amparo suit. The extent to which Costa Rican courts are willing to sup-
port officials in their exercise of discretion forms a separate section below.
Enforcement of Orders
As set forth above, the Law of Amparo equips the courts with effec-
tive enforcement tools in order to persuade officials to reply and to insure
the timeliness of petitions. The law also establishes a seemingly mandatory
penalty for those who would scoff at court orders proceeding from amparo
actions. Within forty-eight hours of the court order, the functionary or
employee responsible for the violation must comply or be sentenced to
prison for six months to three years.26
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A repeated violation evokes even harsher treatment. If a losing de-
fendant in a prior amparo suit commits the same offense and is sued
again by the prior petitioner, he will be sentenced to one to four years'
imprisonment. 27
The respect accorded courts in Costa Rica should alone produce an
effective amparo. With the sharp teeth installed by the Law of Amparo
to reinforce the Judiciary's esteemed position, Costa Rican courts, unlike
their counterparts in other Latin American countries, have a potentially
powerful instrument to protect individuals in the exercise of their constitu-
tional rights.
SURVEY OF AMPARO DECISIONS
The format of the amparo opinions published for this period reflects
the strong position of the courts. Like opinions written in more prominent
countries such as Argentina and Brazil,28 dissents and concurring opinions
appear. Early amparo cases upholding government suppression of Com-
munist literature and disruption of meetings of allegedly Communist or-
ganizations brought forth powerful, well-reasoned dissents.
29
Amparo opinions, particularly those emanating from a Iuzgado Penal,
typically present the petitioner's case first (sometimes in his own words),
incorporate the official reply with little apparent abridgement, summarize
by listing facts proved and unproved, and declare the amparo granted
or denied with a short statement of supporting reasons. Opinions are quite
complete in their recital of facts and usually thorough in dealing with
each of the complainant's claims.
Subject Matter
Overall, amparos in this period reflect the efforts of the government
to protect the moral and social fabric of society, to regulate local com-
merce, and to invade minimally some property rights for the public benefit.
Thus, many amparos involved the closing down of establishments alleged
to be housing prostitutes while operating in the guise of hotels, bars, and
even restaurants) 0 Evictions of inhabitants of these places caused other
complaints. A multitude of suits concerned restrictions on small bars and
night-clubs which were considered scandalous but had not reached the
proportions of the first group of establishments. Complaints in this latter
group involved the suspension of operating licenses,31 enforcement of early
closing hours,32 and revocation of permission to install a juke box
(roc-kola).3
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Almost as many suits centered on measures to rid the streets of iti-
nerant or street corner kiosk peddlers. 34 Municipal resolutions banning
street vending of certain items and denial of licenses to operate came
under fire.
Claimed encroachments on property rights by the state also led to a
number of amparo actions throughout this period.
At least three-fourths of the suits concerned expropriation of land
or removal of stones from river banks, both to be used for highway
construction, particularly for the Pan American Highway. 35 Other peti-
tions dealing with land focused on rights held by the National Electric
Service, to stone and gravel from rivers, 36 and water rights. 37 Municipal
regulation of frontage and levels of new buildings38 and designation of
parking and loading areas on streets where plaintiffs operated their shops39
were also attacked as takings of private property.
In the first half of the 1950's, owners and drivers of passenger-
carrying vehicles frequently appealed denials of permits to drive certain
routes between cities. 40 The complaints appeared to stem from clumsy
governmental attempts to compensate for the scarcity of transportation by
assigning fixed routes to carriers and standardizing the vehicles. Upon
the expansion of highways in the country these petitions disappeared, only
to be replaced by petitions from those whose property was impinged upon
by the highway construction process.
Another category of complaint was not quite as short-lived as that
concerning passenger service but nonetheless reached a definite peak early
in the 1950's. From 1950 through 1953, allegedly Communist organiza-
tions protested governmental disruptions of their meetings, false arrests
of their members, and confiscation of their publications by the Civil
Guard.4' Such repressive actions can be attributed to the anti-Communist
attitudes of those who had led the successful 1948 uprising against
Calder6n's government, 42 which had aligned itself with the Costa Rican
Communist party. The Korean War reinforced the government's Cold War
fears. When memories of the 1948 uprising had faded and the Korean
War had ended, complaints of harassment and denial of free expression
similarly abated.
In 1960, however, the amparos revealed renewed confiscation of
literature purported -to be Communist propaganda. This time the Cuban
revolution probably acted as a trigger. Confiscation and censorship were
institutionalized within the Consultant Group on Publications (Junta
Consultiva de Publicaciones).43
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Except for this last group of petitions, which stemmed from govern-
mental repression in the face of a perceived threat to national security,
the other complaints generally concerned relatively new laws, passed after
1949. Looked at as a whole, these new laws were aimed at social develop-
ment and public works rather than strictly at economic development. At
most, they were concerned with the infrastructure on which development
would later be based.
Those recent laws conferred discretionary powers on officials charged
with executing them. The government could thereby interfere with private
rights to a greater extent than before and perhaps with less predictability.
Those affected by the intrusion of government into unexpected areas
reacted by questioning the legitimacy of the acts of public authorities.
To some extent, amparo petitions in this period reflect insecurity caused
by the expansion of government and an unwillingness to accept that
functionaries possessed the authority to act in such novel ways.
Merryman terms this interference by government the "publiciza-
tion" of private law and states that "the expanded role of government has
often been viewed as leading to a contraction of the area of free play
of private autonomy." 44 State intervention is potentially more of a threat
to private rights in civil law countries because it not only pre-empts areas
of private activity but also public law brings with it rules of its own.
There the role of government was not limited to the protection
of private rights; on the contrary, the driving consideration
was the effectuation of the public interest by state action. . ..
In public legal relations the state was a party and, as represen-
tative of the public interest (and as successor to the prince),
superior to the private individual.45
In attempting to subject the state to overriding principles of constitu-
tional law to protect their private rights, the petitioners in Costa Rica
were carrying even further the publicization of private law. 46 The courts,
on the other hand, appeared willing to impose private law principles on
the state, especially to enforce contracts for reimbursement for expropria-
tion. Thus, the loosening of public law versus private law concepts can be
seen clearly in amparo cases.
The mixing of these two categories of law is aided by the concept of
"public order". The latter term is defined as those principles, which may
be drawn from private law as well as from public law, representing the
general interests of society. Some courts in amparo actions have required
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that the law underlying government action be one of the public order
in order to justify interfering with private rights. This requirement is
discussed below in the section on dismissals of petitions.
In summary, a theme which runs through the majority of amparo
actions during these twelve years is the interference by the state with pri-
vate rights in an unexpected, novel manner. The expanded role of the
state has implications for the traditional concepts of public law and private
law. Courts handling amparo cases in this period did not attempt to
maintain the distinction between private law and public law but rather
subsumed them in the concept of public order.
Amparo Petitioners
The amparo complainants who paraded past the courts in this period
were predominantly middle-class and engaged in commerce. Small mer-
chants, owners of corner bars, restaurants and night clubs, and people who
ferried a few small boats or ran bus lines between cities appeared most
often. A few white-collar workers, employed by the state, used amparo
to protest wage reductions47 and dismissals which allegedly did not comply
with the Labor Code.48
Not infrequently, landowners sued in amparo, but the size of their
holdings cannot be established by the information in the opinions. Only
a few are expressly described as owners of coffee farms. 49 Courts sym-
pathetically portray the plight of others, who are probably small land
owners.50 As for the bulk of land-related petitions, one can only surmise
from the courts' conclusions about the superiority of the public purpose
for taking the land that the size of the holdings are substantial, else the
courts might at least have mentioned the countervailing equities.
Several major businessmen filed amparo petitions during these years.
Among them were an exporter of scrap metal,51 a director of a flour im-
porting firm,5 2 and the manager and owner of a Costa Rican airline com-
pany." Two attorneys also instituted amparo actions, one for access to
government information he needed in his practice and one to protest the
lifting of his license plates twice for parking violations.5 4
Leftist organizations and individuals frequently used the amparo
action. These routinely unsuccessful petitioners included editors of suspect
newspapers,5 leaders of various Communist-linked parties, 6 and mem-
bers who received "subversive" literature in bulk through the mails.57
Suspected of more active agitation were certain aliens who sued to block
their imminent deportation. 58
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The last distinct group of petitioners consists of dock workers in
the provinces of Lim6n and Puntarenas. No other category of laborers
brought amparo suits during this period even though the workers on
foreign-owned plantations in the same two provinces were the most highly
organized workers of all.59 Perhaps their active trade unions provided an
effective substitute for amparo suits.
Dock workers complained exclusively of suspension of their Identifica-
tion Cards (carnets) and work permits which afforded them access to
the docks under the Law of Registry of Dock and Customs Workers.
60
Officials lifted the documents whenever charges of theft or smuggling
were pending against the worker.
In brief, the majority of individuals who brought amparo actions in
this period fell into two broad categories: (1) owners of small businesses,
including bars, restaurants, hotels, shorthaul passenger transport, general
stores, and (2) landowners, probably most with holdings greater than the
size of single-family farms. The remainder of cases involved intellectuals
with alleged Communist affiliations, aliens, dock workers, and a very few
professionals and substantial businessmen. Conspicuously absent were
workers in areas other than docks and foreign-owned companies.
ANALYSIS OF DISMISSALS
Courts during this period typically denied amparos on one or more
of the following three grounds: (1) the defendant officials had not acted
arbitrarily; (2) no constitutional rights had been violated; and (3) the
amparo action fell within the forbidden categories of Art. 3 of the Law
of Amparo.
Lack of Arbitrariness
The amparo is available only against "acts which are obviously ar-
bitrary or unjustified and which are aimed at preventing or threatening
the exercise of individual rights. ' 61 So long as the official is acting in
accordance with a law which has not been declared unconstitutional, his
actions are per se not "arbitrary.' '62 The Corte Plena has also defined
"arbitrary" to mean "lack of motive to justify the act."'63 Consequently,
the term "unjustified" in the phrase quoted at the outset. is surplusage
because "arbitrary" has been defined to encompass it.
Plaintiffs are severely burdened by the definition of "arbitrary"
which merely requires the official to show any motive to explain his act.
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That is, since an official can overcome a plaintiff's allegation that an
act was arbitrary merely by showing some motive which could possibly
explain his act, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a plain-
tiff will prevail. A post facto rationale to justify an act is easily developed,
particularly if it will not be examined closely by the courts.
"Obviously arbitrary" is interpreted by courts to imply an objective
standard. However, though sometimes requested to impose a fine on
petitioners for having sued maliciously, courts have never done so. Rather,
they admit that the act complained of may reasonably have appeared to
be arbi-trary to the petitioner.
An explanation for such judicial narrowing of the availability of the
amparo action is found in the existence concurrently of the "action of
unconstitutionality" to challenge a law.64 Courts apparently decided that
the constitutional and legislative intent was to provide two non-overlapping
actions. The action of unconstitutionality which has more venerable ante-
cedents in Costa Rica -than the amparo, pre-empts the area of challenges
to laws on grounds of unconstitutionality. What remains for amparo
jurisdiction is the challenge to official acts or omissions. But courts will
not allow such suits to be converted into tests of the constitutionality of
the underlying laws. A law untouched by an action of unconstitutionality
is, for purposes of the amparo petition, irrefutably presumed constitutional
and confers immunity on one acting in accord with its provisions. The
law itself must be attacked in a different proceeding.
Some near-laws do not carry sufficient weight to protect officials
who follow them, from the charge of arbitrariness. An executive regula-
tion, for example, cannot be relied upon to authorize an official act
because it does not rise to the level of a decree law.65 Officials also dis-
covered that an "administrative norm" is a foundation of sand.66 On the
other hand, a resolution of a municipal council commands the same respect
as any national law in the amparo proceedings.
Some later amparo decisions suggest that the only laws which can
preserve an official act from the flaw of arbitrariness are those which
are part of the "public order":
Furthermore, the acts attributed to the functionary against whom
the plaintiff is proceeding do not partake of that characteristic
of arbitrariness or illegality, rather they stem from laws of the
public order.6 7
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As amparo actions almost always involve laws which are unmistakably
of the public order, courts are not really constricting the range of justifica-
tions for official action.
The concept of public order is vital in the area of public exercise of
discretionary power. Courts in this period frequently refused to examine
the manner in which officials exercised grants of discretionary power as
long as the exercise promoted the public order. Therefore, the Civil Guard
could be upheld in its arrests of pacifist petition-carriers because its acts
were discretionary and aimed at upholding the public order." In the
same way, decisions of official censorship boards could not be questioned
via amparo because they were given discretion in the interests of the
public order.69
The absence of arbitrary action has accounted for the largest number
of dismissals. No petitioner attempted to argue that the law underlying the
official's act was not of the public order; indeed, it is difficult to find
a law mentioned in the decisions which cannot be construed as constituting
part of the public order. Therefore, what appears to be a slight crack
in the official defense to a charge of unconstitutional action is probably
unavailable.
The laws partaking of the public order which are often cited are as
follows: Law of Municipal Ordinances and the Sanitary Code (for closing
down dubious establishments), Law of Passenger Transport Service, Law
of Transit, Law of Public Roads, Law Regulating Aliens, Law of Registry
of Dock and Customs Workers, and Law Banning Publications Against
the Security of the State. In addition, specific municipal resolutions aimed
at particular individuals are cited. From their titles and from what the
opinions reveal of their substance, the laws are part of the package dis-
cussed above whose objective was to improve the social order and to
promote public works. By upholding official actions pursuant to these
laws, courts in this period perforce supported the new programs of the
progressive government. The hurdle of proving arbitrary action forced
a petitioner who was injured 'by these new laws to go the route of an
action of unconstitutionality or to abandon his complaint altogether.
Violation oj a Constitutional Right
The requirement that an act 'be arbitrary is usually mentioned in
conjunction with the second requirement that the act complained of pre-
vent or threaten the exercise of a constitutional right. Merely proving
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the official acted contrary to law is not sufficient; the petitioner must also
show an invasion of one of his rights as a result. "The action of amparo
is to control the constitutionality, and not the legality, of the dispositions,
acts or resolutions of public functionaries." 70
Occasionally courts have found that officials did not follow the law,
but this circumstance does not inevitably lead to a grant of the amparo.
According to the courts, an act may be contrary to existing law, and
therefore arbitrary, but it does not thereby necessarily violate any con-
stitutional right.71
Even procedural arbitrariness does not rise to the level of unconsti-
tutionality, to the courts' way of thinking. As an example, the procedure
whereby establishments of dubious reputation are closed down would con-
stitute an unconstitutional denial of due process in the United States. Usually
a municipal official acts solely on the basis of complaints and does not
afford the owner notice or a hearing before he orders the closing. Some-
times the owner first learns of the order when he reads it in a newspaper.
Amparo courts do not review the regularity or fairness of the procedure
and are in fact willing to borrow from common law countries to invoke
precedent in order summarily to uphold orders shutting down such places:
"In similar cases this court (Corte Plena) has decided in the same way."
Costa Rican courts construe the due process guarantee of Art. 39 of
the Constitution of 1949 as applicable only in criminal cases. Furthermore,
one Penal Judge expressed the opinion that procedural short-cuts are
justified in a country which is "so undisciplined." His reference was to the
handling of traffic violations, and discipline may be particularly lacking
in that area, but the assumption may be more universal. If so, it may
help to explain the courts' acceptance of summary, one-sided procedures
on the part of government officials who surely do not have the authority
to act on rumors, gossip, and tips.
Petitioners have not accepted the courts' statements that arbitrary
actions are not ipso facto constitutional violations. Two articles of the
Constitution of 1949 arguably are contravened when an official acts arbi-
trarily. Arguments based on Art. 33, guaranteeing equality under the law,
have simply been ignored by the courts. Attempts to use Art. 11, which
provides that public functionaries "cannot arrogate to themselves faculties
which the law does not give them," have met with more success. How-
ever, the Corte Plena refused to consider a petition which alleged a viola-
tion of Art. 11 alone because it did not state a personal right. 72 When
courts agree to consider the possible violation of Art. 11, the petitioner
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has invariably linked that particular provision to other claims based on
more acceptable articles. The success of contentions based on Art. 11, even
in conjunction with other articles, appears to depend on the official's act-
ing without any law at all behind him. 73
Arbitrary official action in itself may not clearly violate a consti-
tutional article, yet it may result in an infringement of rights which are
admittedly protected by a constitutional guarantee. But for the first two
years of its existence, the Law of Amparo provided that it protected only
"individual rights." The articles falling under Title V, entitled "Social
Rights and Guarantees," could not be invoked in amparo. The only
amparo case in which a law was declared unconstitutional was a decision
by the Corte Plena that the Law of Amparo had unconstitutionally nar-
rowed the scope of Art. 48 of the -Constitution of 1949. 7 4 The court held
that Art. 48 had established amparo to protect all rights, social as well
as individual. The Law of Amparo was promptly amended to remove the
limitation to individual rights. 75
A court dismissing a petition which has stated a good constitutional
claim often feels compelled to deal with the claim, although sometimes it
stops at the lack of arbitrary action. Frequently a balancing process, such
as occurs in United States due process cases, ensues in which the invaded
right is weighed against the public interest. However, the state will most
likely win every amparo case because its interest in maintaining the pub-
lic order always outweighs the individual interest. Public law is of pri-
mary importance. In essence, "public order" is shorthand for "compelling
state interest" in such cases.
Courts, as a last resort, construe the words of the constitutional
guarantee to exclude the interest at stake. This method was used almost
entirely in the area of freedom of expression to arrive at support for state
suppression. For example, television programs were deemed to be "specta-
cles" rather than an "expression of thought. '76 Communist publications
mailed to a petitioner were not "private documents" susceptible of pro-
tection under Art. 24 because they were intended to be read publicly, and
they could not be protected as "written communication" because the only
act taking place in Costa Rica was distribution, not publication. 77
In summary, a variety of judicial devices have arisen to prevent
finding the violation of a constitutional right or to justify it when it has
been found. The fact that a law 'belongs to the public order may defeat
,a petitioner who can show a constitutional violation just as that fact enters
into the decision on arbitrariness.
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Article 3
The Law of Amparo in Art. 3 sets forth five circumstances fatal to
an amparo action. The most frequently cited is subsection (d) which
requires the exhaustion of the remedies established by law for the acts
complained of. In general, petitioners had failed to appeal the act of a
subordinate to his superior. 78 Of advantage to petitioners is the inapplica-
bility of the exhaustion requirement if initiation of the other remedy has
not produced any result within fifteen days.
Petitions stumble over the other subsections of Art. 3 less often.
According to subsection (a), amparo will not lie against "legislative dis-
positions." Under this subsection, the Corte Plena dismissed a challenge
to a municipal building code because it was passed in accordance with the
national Law of Construction and thus fell within the haven provided for
legislative enactments.79 Protests against ministerial acts apparently were
considered equivalent to protesting the law itself for purposes of subsection
(a). For example, the subsection was applied to a case in which the mayor
closed down a bar whose location was prohibited by the express, detailed
terms of the Liquor Law. 0
Judicial dispositions are similarly immune from challenge by amparo
under subsection (b) if the court in question is acting within its com-
petence. Moreover, subsection (c) protects administrative authorities who
are merely executing orders of a court.81
Subsection (e), which exempts consented-to acts, has been discussed
above in the context of presumptive consent. Courts have also implied
consent from actions and oral assurances. In one case, a verbal expression
of willingness to have land used temporarily for storage of highway con-
struction machinery was sufficient to allow the use of the land without
payment.8 2 Petitioner claimed that his consent had not been sought or
obtained formally, but the Corte Plena, over a strong dissent, held his oral
acquiescence to be sufficient to bring subsection (e) into play.
Some Latin American amparos include dismissals for mootness in their
counterparts to Art. 3.83 It is clear that the Costa Rican Legislature con-
templated the mootness issue. Art. 15 of the Law of Amparo directs courts
to admonish functionaries and hold them subject to the penalties for re-
peating their offense despite the mootness of the case. Dismissal for moot-
ness is not expressly provided. Nonetheless, courts have determined that
in moot cases they cannot "restore the enjoyment of constitutional rights,"
which is the purpose of amparo, so they dismiss for mootness although not
specifically authorized to do so. 84
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The exceptions listed in Art. 3 can be attributed to the doctrine of
separation of powers. In Costa Rica, this doctrine is well-respected, so the
Judiciary observes the terms of Art. 3 punctiliously. Even so, of the am-
paro petitions dismissed during this period, fewer than one-fourth were
denied under Art. 3 or for mootness. The remainder were denied on the
two grounds examined earlier.
GRANTS OF AMPARO
The small percentage of cases in which petitioners succeeded in their
suits fall into four areas: (1) right to work; (2) freedom of expression;
(3) property rights; and (4) access to public information. Official cor-
ruption figured in one case.
Right to Work
Courts upheld claims based on the right to work on very distinctive
and narrow fact patterns. In two cases, the controlling factor appeared to
be that the public authority was attempting to limit the location in which
petitioners could open their establishments.8 5 The administrative presump-
tion that the location was somehow to blame for the immoral nature of
the business operating there was found to be unconstitutional. Denial of
a permit based on that particular ground would be found an abuse of
discretion.
Challenges to government control of passenger transport routes re-
sulted well for plaintiffs before the end of 1951, at which time the Law
of Passenger Transport Services was enacted.8 6 Thereafter, any regulation
of routes which injured a complainant was held not to be arbitrary because
based on a law in effect.
Another type of right to work case which succeeded concerned a
dock worker whose carnet was listed due to his arrest, although he was
later released from jail.8 7 The court restricted suspension of the carnet
to cases in which there was at least probable cause for the arrest.
Freedom of Expression
The very first Costa Rican amparo decision held that an order not
to broadcast a controversial radio program violated freedom of expression,
despite the national security grounds the official gave for his action.88 The
right to petition was upheld in another early case in which the Progressive
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Party had received no response to its petition for recognition by the
Municipal Council on the basis that it was Communist-linked. 89
One of the last decisions of this period granted the amparo against
the destruction of newspapers. 90 There the court was swayed more by the
fact that the defendant official had acted on his own without waiting for
a pronouncement from the Consultant Group for Publications than by the
violation of freedom of expression.
Amparo petitions were upheld in this area only rarely. Whenever they
proceeded against an entity other than the Civil Guard, the chances of
success were improved immensely. The Civil Guard appeared to have
almost unlimited discretion to take action against behavior which it deemed
to be subversive of the national security and contrary to democratic prin-
ciples.
Property Rights
The private interests in property which were able to withstand analy-
sis in terms of the social function of property were those of small holders.91
The state, in these cases, could not prove that it was entitled to any part
of the land in question either by reference to earlier transactions or by
citing a law.
One amparo was used to uphold a private commercial interest against
another private interest in land. It proceeded against local police, but in
substance the defendant was the United Fruit Company, which had used
the police as its agents to order petitioner's business off what it claimed
to be its private property. 92 The court held that the property at issue had
been used as a public road for such a long time that it could not be closed
without violating the Law of Public Roads.
Access to Information
Art. 30 of the Constitution of 1949 grants access to government
departments for information pertaining to the public interest. Courts
have assiduously upheld this right except when the information is not
even colorably of public interest. 93 As a result, Art. 30 has developed into
an effective and valuable instrument for insuring freedom of information.
Access to government cannot depend on paying a bribe, however.
An attorney was charged a fee for the return of his license plates by a
functionary who apparently pocketed the money. 94 The court gravely
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observed that this act violated the constitutional prohibition against im-
posing fines without prior sentence. This case of arguable corruption was
the only one of its kind in this period.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to say whether amparo in Costa Rica between 1950 and
1962 had any effect on the actions of government officials and func-
tionaries. Its potential for controlling behavior was, in essence, limited
to discretionary acts of public authorities, and abuse of discretion, or
arbitrariness, could only be found if there were no law in force or no
possible motive to justify the action. Authorities seemed to continue ac-
tively to carry out post-1949 measures despite amparo actions. Even re-
peated actions under the same law did not serve to chill official behavior
under that law.
It is not surprising that the courts did not become an instrument
to undercut reformist legislation in this period. The National Liberation
Party in Costa Rica, which provided the Presidents from 1949 through
1959 and staffed the Legislature and the bureaucracy for even longer,95
probably also produced the judges. It had begun as an organization of
law students and was dominated by the middle class. 96 Judges before whom
amparo petitions came were undoubtedly in sympathy with the legislative
measures which prompted the complaints.
Not only were judges favorably disposed toward the progressive
legislation, but they early set boundaries for themselves to which they
adhered to throughout. The Law of Amparo itself precluded direct at-
tacks on laws, and indirect attacks were similarly blocked by the judge-
made rule that a defendant acting in accordance with a law was :not
acting arbitrarily.
Measures which prompted the most challenges were in effect quite
conservative. Many were aimed at moral regeneration of urban areas.
Those laws formed the basis for paternalistic behavior on the part of
government: closing bars early to conserve earnings of presumably spend-
thrift workers, prohibiting juke boxes because they might be a source of
immorality, censoring television programs and publications, housing: itin-
erant peddlers in municipal centers to get them off the streets, and shutting
down unsavory establishments upon complaints of townspeople. Perhaps
most Latin American judiciaries could be depended upon to uphold official
action taken in response to such laws.
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One area of more radical change is expropriation. Here, Costa Rican
courts merely looked for a law which granted the power to expropriate,
usually the Law of Public Roads. If the purpose for which the land was
taken was legal, the taking was upheld. Courts were willing to deny
medium to large-sized landholders any remedy other than compensation.
One presumes that the compensation was less than adequate, although
no amparo was brought to protest the amount of reimbursement received
from the state, because the takings would not have generated as many
amparos if fair market value were paid.
In the area of amparo, therefore, courts did not hinder, if they did
not promote, social and economic development measures legislated by the
state. Economic development was in its infancy during most of this period, 97
but development of human resources and building up transportation and
marketing infrastructures proceeded apace. Costa Rican courts, by pro-
tecting official action to implement the laws from challenges for abuse
of discretion, may have prevented the amparo action from becoming the
instrument to dismantle some of the new legislation. Although the areas
in which the amparo was called upon to operate seem relatively trivial,
the narrow availability of amparo had implications for the wider sphere
of laws of the public order in general.
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